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Economic Indicators  
as Public Interventions
Gil Eyal and Moran Levy 
The main argument of this essay is that the term public intellectual is too 
narrow for historical research about the public influence of economists 
and economic expertise. We propose, instead, the concept of public inter-
ventions to inform a more comprehensive approach, one that broadens the 
analytical frame by multiplying the relevant actors, modes, and targets of 
intervention yet could still include within it research on public intellectu-
als narrowly construed. As an empirical example, we suggest that the 
design and diffusion of economic indicators—specifically, the GDP and 
the myriad indicators compiled in recent years as part of proposals to 
replace it with a better representation of human welfare—could be ana-
lyzed as a specific mode by which economists intervene in and shape the 
public sphere. This argument, about the profound influence wielded by 
those who design economic indicators, has of course been made by many 
others—especially feminists—before us (Alonso and Star 1987; Berkow-
itz 1996; Block and Burns 1986; Folbre 1989; Waring 1988). Its signifi-
cance here is merely in demonstrating the wide terrain that opens up for 
historical and sociological analysis once we broaden our scope from intel-
lectuals to interventions.
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The approach we propose is inspired by Michel Foucault’s (2000) dis-
tinction between the “universal” and “specific” intellectual; Pierre Bour-
dieu’s ([1992] 1996) replacement of the latter by a “collective intellectual”; 
and the approach to the public sphere urged by the contributors to Making 
Things Public (Latour and Weibel 2005). Additionally, our suspicion that 
the concept of public intellectual is too narrow for capturing the specific 
way in which economists intervene in public affairs follows in the footsteps 
of the many sociologists of economics who have tried to analyze how eco-
nomic expertise is deployed to shape public affairs, or how it “preforms” 
the economy (Breslau 1998, 2003; Callon 1998; Foucault 1991; Fourcade 
2009; MacKenzie, Muniesa, and Siu 2007; Mitchell 1998; Rose, O’Malley, 
and Valverde 2006; Yonay 1998).
In the first section of this essay, we elaborate this argument in theoreti-
cal terms. We provide a brief genealogy of the concept of public intellec-
tual, to explain why it is too narrow for present purposes. Then we draw 
on Foucault, Bourdieu, and others to develop an analytical framework for 
research on interventions, distinguishing between agencies, modes, and 
targets of intervention. In the second section, we argue that this approach, 
focusing on interventions rather than intellectuals, is especially suited for 
guiding research on the public deployments of economic expertise. In the 
third section, we offer a brief history of the origins of the GDP (and of the 
system of national accounts more generally), aiming to substantiate our 
treatment of it as a specific target of public intervention by economists. 
The fourth and final section analyzes the now four-decades-long collec-
tive attempt to provide a summary index of human welfare and economic 
progress that could replace, supplement, or correct GDP, as such public 
interventions. 
From Public Intellectuals  
to Public Interventions
A concept like public intellectual cannot be just picked up ready-made to 
be used for analytical purposes. It trails behind it a long history of uses 
and abuses that is activated every time one deploys it unawares. The con-
cept of intellectual in its modern meaning was invented during the Drey-
fus affair (1894–1906). It was not coined for analytical or diagnostic pur-
poses but as a political mobilizing device, a rallying call designed to bring 
into being the very category it was naming. Moreover, it was an exercise 
in self-definition, since those who issued the call considered themselves to 
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1. For comparison’s sake, the term intellectuals without qualifiers entered English-language 
discussions during the first decade of the twentieth century (following the Dreyfus affair), 
enjoyed a steady climb, and peaked around 1970. Discussions of “intellectuals” then declined 
till 1985, when they picked up again and by 1995 returned to 1970 levels. We suspect that the 
coining of the term public intellectual revived the interest in intellectuals more generally, for 
reasons explained in the text above: see the Ngram we constructed using Google Books at 
books.google.com/ngrams/graph?content=public+intellectual%2Cintellectuals&year_
start=1880&year_end=2000&corpus=0&smoothing=1 (accessed November 8, 2012). To test 
whether these results are robust, we also conducted a similar search on JSTOR. We found that 
the conjunction public intellectual appears in the title of 67 articles, the first of which is from 
1988 and is a review of Jacoby’s book. It had never been used in the title of an article before. The 
conjunction appears in the full text of 2,769 articles, only 62 (2.2 percent) of which precede 
1987. A textual check shows that in the majority of these 62 articles the conjunction does not 
identify an individual or a social role but is a different, unrelated usage (e.g., “public intellectual 
life” or something similar).
be the best representatives of the category and addressed it to the like-
minded (Bauman 1987, 2–8). The later career of the concept involved a 
continuous tangle between those who wanted to give it objective analyti-
cal meaning and extend it to wider circles of the educated, and those who 
sought to redraw the boundary between who is and who is not a “true” 
intellectual. This boundary work (Gieryn 1999) often took the form of 
accusations that intellectuals have betrayed their “true” mission (Benda 
[1927] 1928), and it ultimately informed a problematic of allegiance that 
pervaded all the later attempts to give the concept an objective analytical 
meaning (Eyal and Buchholz 2010).
Within this history, the concept of public intellectual plays a very spe-
cific role. The first point to note is that it is a very recent construction. 
As can be seen in figure 1, the conjunction public intellectual hardly 
existed before 1987, when, no doubt, the publication of Russell Jacoby’s 
book The Last Intellectuals marked the moment when the term came 
into ever-widening circulation.1
The second point to note is a certain touch of redundancy in the con-
junction public intellectual: are not intellectuals precisely those who in 
their writing and speaking appeal to a broad public? Is not the notion of 
public intervention and public audience already contained in the term 
intellectual? What exactly is done by adding the qualifier public? This 
peculiarity can be understood only against the background of the history 
of the concept, as noted above. This history is characterized by continuous 
attempts to extend the category of intellectuals to characterize a larger 
“new class” composed of experts, reaching a peak in the late 1970s 
(Bruce-Briggs 1979; Gouldner 1979; Konrad and Szelenyi 1979; Walker 
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1979). Adding the qualifier public, therefore, was boundary work meant to 
exclude experts from the category and to signal that true intellectuals are 
not experts: they are not entangled in mundane technical affairs but 
address a broad public, owing allegiance only to truth and universal val-
ues. Since this conjunction first appeared in a book titled The Last Intel-
lectuals, a book that belonged in the genre of jeremiad (mixture of lament 
and accusation) about the decline of true intellectuals and betrayal of their 
original mission (Posner 2001), it activates not only boundary work from 
experts but also a whole narrative about decline, “endangered species,” the 
threat of betrayal (by turning expert), extinction (by a society of exper-
tise), and consequently a debate about whether public intellectuals are dis-
appearing or reappearing on the Web and the blogosphere (Donatich 
2001; Fuller 2004; Kellner 1997). Using this term with respect to econo-
mists—who are first and foremost technical experts, whatever else they 
are, and for whom the diagnostic problem is not to understand a decline in 
their public role, but on the contrary a broadening and increase of their 
influence (Markoff and Montecinos 1993)—dooms the analysis in 
advance. It privileges a narrow focus on speech acts that have been inten-
tionally framed as nontechnical (via their mode and site of delivery, via 
the prominence claimed by their authors), although in reality they always 
reference the technical, whether explicitly or implicitly, and could not be 
efficacious without it.
Fortunately, the history of writing about intellectuals affords us with 
a more productive alternative, represented by Foucault’s (2000, 128) dis-
tinction between the universal and specific intellectual. While the clas-
sic “universal” intellectual fits the mold of what is meant by “public 
intellectual”—the prototype is represented by the engaged man of letters 
(Émile Zola, Jean-Paul Sartre) who speaks in the name of truth and uni-
versal values—the specific intellectual is an expert. Foucault’s example of 
a “specific intellectual” is Robert Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer, says Fou-
cault, was an individual whose narrow technical work as expert acquired 
universal dimensions when it threatened the whole human species with 
extinction, and who consequently was compelled to intervene in public 
affairs. Foucault concludes, therefore, that there is no reason to draw a 
strong distinction between intellectuals and experts: “The intellectual is 
simply the person who uses his knowledge, his competence and his rela-
tion to truth in the field of political struggles.” Put differently, what is 
common to all who may be termed “specific intellectuals” is not that they 
correspond to a specific social type (since experts come in many different 
forms and shapes), but the movement by which their local and technical 
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knowledge acquires a more general and public value and becomes the 
basis for an intervention in public affairs. The case of Oppenheimer, once 
again, is instructive. Oppenheimer did not begin as the independent, 
engaged critic that he came to embody later. He started as an expert work-
ing in the service of the state, first at the Manhattan Project, and then as 
chairman of the General Advisory Committee to the Atomic Energy 
Commission (AEC). It was from this position that he began lobbying for 
international arms control, that is, that he began intervening in public 
affairs. Eventually, his activism led to the revocation of his security clear-
ance in 1954 during the heyday of McCarthyism, and he became a bona 
fide dissident intellectual. What is interesting about Oppenheimer surely 
is not this final result but the movement that took him from technical con-
cerns and state service to increasingly independent intervention in public 
affairs. What Foucault did was not to add another type but to draw ana-
lytic attention to the enduring element in the concept of intellectual, the 
part that is indifferent to boundary work and classificatory struggles, and 
that could serve as a basis for reconstructing the concept.
Once we focus on this enduring element, namely, the movement by 
which knowledge acquires value as intervention in public affairs, we can 
see that given the right preconditions or precipitating events many differ-
ent actors and social types could play this role. In fact, why should the 
agents of intervention be only individuals? Why not also groups, collec-
tives, even organizations? This was Bourdieu’s ([1992] 1996) criticism of 
Foucault. In contemporary conditions, he said, the agent of public inter-
vention is most often a “collective intellectual,” a group of experts work-
ing together. The same message comes from the literature on “epistemic 
communities” (Haas 1992). Broadening the field of investigation in this 
way reveals the “public intellectual” to be merely shorthand for one spe-
cific actor laying claim to one specific mode of intervention—typically the 
manifesto, the signed petition, the polemical op-ed piece (and now the 
blog), the gesture of “revelation,” prophesying, “speaking truth to power,” 
as well as propounding “transformative ideas” (Bell 1960; Gouldner 
1975–76; Bauman 1987)—in one specific type of public arena.
Instead of research focusing on a certain social (and normative) type, 
asking whether individual economists fit this mold, as some essays in 
this volume do, it would be far more profitable to analyze the movement 
by which economic knowledge and expertise are mobilized to inform a 
value-laden intervention in the public sphere. In this essay, we would 
like to draw on earlier work (Eyal and Buchholz 2010) to propose a con-
ceptual framework suitable for this type of analysis:
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 1.  Agencies of intervention: The term public intellectual tends to priv-
ilege the actions and pronouncements of a few prominent figures. 
As noted earlier, this inevitably leads to boundary work, and can 
often degenerate into hagiography or into its opposite, a narrative of 
decline and betrayal. Instead, we suggest several ways of widening 
the category of relevant actors into multiple agencies of interven-
tion: first, we follow Bourdieu in considering not only individuals 
but also collectives of practitioners, networks constituting epistemic 
communities, even organizations such as think tanks. Second, inev-
itably this means that the analysis includes not only the glamorous 
and well-known individuals but the crowds of more “gray” practi-
tioners, who often work together in such collectives away from the 
spotlight enjoyed by prominent figures. Yet, arguably, the public 
impact of their collective work is no less profound. Finally, we ana-
lyze all these agencies—individuals and collectives—in relation to 
one another, as coexisting and interdependent in a field of competi-
tion and contestation over the claim to represent publicly relevant 
knowledge or the proper mode of engaging with public affairs 
(Sapiro 2009).
 2.  Modes of intervention: The term public intellectual, as noted above, 
privileges a particular way of making such claims and of influenc-
ing public affairs. Public intellectuals intervene by means of writ-
ing op-eds, speaking in public, petitioning, or blogging. Put differ-
ently, they intervene by making their opinion known and seeking to 
influence the opinions of others. This seems to us an impoverished 
vision of what it means to intervene in public affairs. Often “it is 
precisely the most technical social science that has the most impor-
tant political effects, even more so because those political effects 
are generally not recognized as such” (Breslau 1998, 39–40). We 
think that Foucault’s point about “specific intellectuals” was pre-
cisely about a movement that takes one from the problems and con-
testations encountered at the technical level to the “political effects” 
of these technicalities. It follows that intervention could be also in 
the form of a report, a technical document, expert testimony, even 
an experimental demonstration (properly publicized), or—as we 
shall emphasize here—in the form of a “politics of measurement,” 
by modifying how matters of public concern are quantified, mea-
sured, and represented (Porter 1995; Breslau 1998; Alonso and Star 
1987; Block and Burns 1986). The crucial point is that the format or 
mode of intervention can take many different forms besides the 
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2. In a play on the old Weberian distinction, we could say that intellectuals live “for opin-
ion,” while pundits (and think tanks) live “of opinion.”
3. Philip Mirowski and Edward Nik-Khah (in this volume) demonstrate the extent to 
which actors within this buffer zone can completely block, distort, or disarm the interven-
tions made by scientists and academics.
publication of one’s written or spoken opinion, and that often the 
most efficacious interventions either come black-boxed as charts, 
figures, numbers, and other technical devices, or they are counter-
strategies that aim precisely to open up these black boxes and make 
the technical public and political.
 3.  Arenas/targets of intervention: The concept of public intellectual 
carries with it a certain normative (Habermasian) vision of its tar-
get as a public sphere of opinion or a sphere of public opinion. This 
is the main reason why the concept of public intellectual often 
comes coupled with a narrative of decline and betrayal, especially 
in the United States, because influencing, orchestrating, even creat-
ing public opinion has become the business of think tanks and they 
are much better at it than intellectuals. It is not a coincidence that 
the concept of public intellectual was coined in the mid-1980s, a 
time marked by the ascendency of second-generation think tanks 
in the American polity, who have professionalized the work of pro-
ducing opinions and of producing individuals who present an opin-
ionated posture as a way of living—pundits, commentators, “talk-
ing heads”2—as well as the work orchestrating and creating “public 
opinion” using modern PR techniques. These organizations crowd 
out, speak over, or buffer the interventions of independent intel-
lectuals (Medvetz 2012).3 But there is a more fundamental (and 
less American-centric) reason why this vision of a public sphere of 
opinion is inadequate. The posture of the public intellectual refer-
ences an agora populated by reasonable citizens, who are presented 
with conflicting opinions and are capable of adjudicating between 
them according to the force of the better argument. The conversa-
tion in this agora hardly ever gets technical, and when it does, the 
suspicion is that somebody is obfuscating, evading the debate, 
using scientific jargon and technical details as ideology (Habermas 
1970). Modern-day politics, however, are increasingly about tech-
nical affairs of which “the public” is ignorant. This has led Walter 
Lippmann to declare the public a “phantom” and others in the inter-
war years to say that public opinion does not exist or that democ-
racy founded on public opinion is a sham masking the rule of 
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experts (Lippmann 1922, 1927; Dewey 1927; Marres 2005; Bin-
kley 1928). The point, however, is more subtle. The point is that 
“opinion” is a very limited way of understanding what constitutes 
the target of public intervention. Concerning technical matters of 
public concern, intervention cannot be efficacious without being 
equipped with all that makes expertise strong, and that opinion by 
itself lacks, namely, techniques, instruments, demonstrations, fig-
ures, charts, numbers.4 We show, indeed, in the next section, how 
public intervention is crafted by collectives of experts and laypeo-
ple, who educate themselves about a technical matter of public con-
cern (the experts need educating too! They are often quite ignorant 
about newly emerging matters of concern) and equip themselves 
with the knowledge and the technical means to craft an interven-
tion. This means, however, that we have to think in terms of a very 
different image of the public sphere. It cannot be this open homoge-
neous space of pure discussion. But nor can it be the closed, quasi-
private space of the laboratory. We must think of it as a channel, or 
more precisely multiple channels, in Bruno Latour’s (2005, 19) 
terms, “the frail conduits through which truths and proofs are 
allowed to enter the sphere of politics.” Put differently, if there are 
public interventions it is because there are already established 
“ports into the Leviathan,” so to speak; there are already institu-
tionalized conduits by means of which particular types of exper-
tise are permanently connected to the state. In our new and admit-
tedly strange topology, the public sphere, or spheres, is not outside 
the state but within its boundary, within fuzzy and thick interfaces 
where expertise and the state interpenetrate and blend into each 
other (Mitchell 1991; Rose 1992). These interfaces constitute mul-
tiple public spheres of sorts, that is, targets of public intervention 
that are directly continuous with the work of experts. The conver-
sation in this space is almost always technical, but not because it is 
obfuscating; on the contrary, as Latour (1987) puts it about science, 
“when controversies flare up, the literature gets technical,” namely, 
it is precisely in the technical details that one finds the politics, the 
opinions, and the values. Recall the example of Oppenheimer: he 
first intervened in public affairs not from outside the state but from 
4. This observation is closely related to Posner’s (2001, 72) argument that the production 
and circulation of public intellectual commentary suffers from a “market failure” because of 
low barriers to entry and poor quality control that is unable to encourage market exit.
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inside it (the Manhattan Project) or from inside its boundary (the 
advisory committee to the AEC). Perhaps what befell Oppen-
heimer the man is less significant than the institutional link he 
helped forge, the fact that the Advisory Committee to the AEC 
constitutes an institutional interface between nuclear physics and 
the state. The intervention of physicists in public affairs about 
nuclear matters need not come from “outside.” It is an extension of 
their work as advisers for the AEC, and it would most likely flow 
through institutionalized channels and grooves. It would not be 
mere “opinion,” but would most likely come equipped with charts, 
statistics, experiments, and calculations.
Ultimately, our point is not that there are no individuals who could be rea-
sonably identified as “public intellectuals” (although never without implicit 
or explicit boundary work excluding others from the same status), nor do 
we wish to reject the use of the biographical or prosopographical method 
in historical analysis, nor are we suggesting that there is no point in ana-
lyzing a media “space of opinion” (Jacobs and Townsley 2012) where such 
individuals may possess significant symbolic capital. Our point is that the 
analytical problem indexed by the concept of intellectual—namely, the 
problem of how knowledge is mobilized to influence public affairs—is 
better served by broadening the analytical lens to include not only promi-
nent individuals but also gray practitioners and collectives (hence even 
biographies of prominent intellectuals must be analyzed in the context of a 
whole field of competing and interdependent agencies); not only op-eds 
and “ideas” but also technical means of shaping, representing, and inter-
vening in public affairs (hence no prosopography of an “epistemic com-
munity” is complete without examining the devices and networks it mobi-
lizes or takes apart as part of its advocacy); not only the mediatized sphere 
of opinion but also the multiple “ports into the Leviathan” established by 
specific types of expertise. All these considerations, we argue, are doubly 
relevant when it comes to economists and the question of how economic 
expertise is mobilized to influence public affairs. 
Why Thinking in Terms of Interventions  
Is Especially Suited for Analyzing the Public 
Impact of Economists and Economic Expertise 
We organize our comments here through the trio of agencies, modes, 
and targets of intervention.
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There are, no doubt, a few prominent economists who enjoy media 
celebrity and opine about public affairs from the pages of the New York 
Times or in best seller books, but they are the exception. The self-percep-
tion of economists is as technical experts, and many wield public influ-
ence not as intellectuals but as advisers, “chief economists” of firms and 
banks, technocrats, and technical innovators. Moreover, by its very nature, 
the work of economic calculation is collaborative and requires academic 
or government economists to join forces with “economists in the wild” 
(Callon 1998), such as accountants, statisticians, risk analysts, and so on. 
In short, economics by its very nature entails multiple and varied agencies 
of intervention.
Some economists, no doubt, write op-eds, as do many other academics 
(Jacobs and Townsley 2012), but to limit analytical attention to this mode 
of intervention is to lose sight of what is most distinctive about economic 
expertise and how it is inserted into the public sphere through formulas, 
charts, accounting conventions, index numbers, and so on. In recent years, 
this point has been made most forcefully by the “performativity” school. 
To say that economics is performative is to argue that it does not describe 
or explain the economy from outside but weaves a network that reaches all 
the way from the citadels of academia through “economists in the wild,” to 
the economic actors themselves, equipping them with calculative prosthe-
ses on which they rely in making decisions (Callon 1998). This argument, 
as we shall see, is in surprising agreement with Wesley Mitchell’s and 
Irving Fisher’s respective visions for how the index numbers and statisti-
cal aggregates they produced were expected to affect economic reality 
(Breslau 2003, 405). Performativity, therefore, has the double sense of (1) 
giving form, pre-forming; the waffle does not exist independently of the 
waffle iron, and things economic—as distinct from what is considered 
“noneconomic”—do not exist independently of the grid of knowledge that 
disentangles and frames them so they become calculable (see also Eyal 
2012); and (2) but to perform is also to act, to intervene; the statements of 
economics are not descriptions, they are ways of “doing things with num-
bers” (to paraphrase the British philosopher J. L. Austin). The relationship 
between economic knowledge and economic reality is not one of descrip-
tion or explanation but, as Daniel Breslau (2011) puts it, “applied Pla-
tonism.” When economists are consulted about the design of electricity 
markets, for example, they compare existing markets with the “platonic” 
model of perfect market competition and ask what institutional arrange-
ments and/or calculative devices would permit these markets to approxi-
mate the functioning of the ideal model. The model itself is not modified 
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by the contrast with reality, but on the contrary, reality is modified to 
approximate the model by equipping economic actors with the means and 
motivations to calculate as if they inhabit the virtual terrain of perfect 
competition. Similarly, the Black-Sholes formula is not a representation of 
existing reality but a tool used to price an option within given limitations 
of information (i.e., it disentangles the option so that calculation is possi-
ble), so that the behavior of market actors can approximate the model of 
perfect competition (MacKenzie 2007; MacKenzie and Milo 2003). I do 
not think, however, that the argument of “performativity” rests on whether 
the introduction of calculative devices and/or institutional arrangements 
modifies economic processes in a way that confirms or disconfirms the 
economic theory from which they derive (what MacKenzie [2007] calls 
“Barnesian performativity” and “counter-performativity,” respectively). 
A tool may be “right for the job” or not. It may do the job well or sloppily. 
But we do not say that the tool has been confirmed or disconfirmed. The 
performativity of economics rests on the fact that its concepts and formu-
las are used as tools to shape the behavior of economic actors. The tools 
are measured not by their “truth” (which belongs to the Platonic realm of 
the ideal model) but by their relative ability to bring about the closest pos-
sible approximation to the desirable output of the ideal model, namely, 
governability—orderly coordination of the autonomous activities of mul-
tiple calculative agencies, predictability, self-correction, responsiveness to 
the “light hand” of a governor who modifies incentives only gradually and 
piecemeal. So most of the time economists intervene in public affairs not 
by writing or commenting to a general audience but through a far more 
“technical” mode of intervention, namely, by equipping economic actors 
and governors with calculative tools designed to bring about governability, 
or by taking apart such calculative devices to expose the assumptions 
about public affairs built into them. The case of index numbers—the topic 
of the next section—is a good example of this mode of intervention.
Moreover, even when economists do write or comment to a general 
audience, it is not always insightful to think of them as public intellectuals. 
The idea of public intellectuals assumes that speech is meant to inform, 
educate, influence, and persuade. As noted earlier, it is intimately tied to 
the concept of opinion. But is this really the best way to construe, let us 
say, what Ben Bernanke has to say about the economy, whether in a press 
conference, a carefully worded Fed dispatch, or even an op-ed piece? 
(McGregor and Young, this volume). Speaking or writing in these cases 
has a completely different value than “opinion.” It is not description or 
even prescription but action, a policy tool. It is part of a game in which 
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the audience construes what is said as intended to signal certain intentions 
or actions on the part of the Fed. So the statements are prepared in advance 
by Fed policymakers reflecting how they expect the audience will con-
strue each and every specific expression, qualifier, adjective, or number. 
Of course, this process of careful preparation and calibration is something 
of which the audience is well aware and takes into its interpretation, which 
means that the drafting has to take into account this double hermeneutic 
layer, and so on and so forth. The same goes for the “chief economists” of 
large banks, who are regularly interviewed in the press to give their opin-
ion or assessment of the state of the economy. They, too, calculate in 
advance what they say because they know that a crowd of investors and 
brokers is listening to the very “tone” of their message, and like good 
economists they are well aware of all the unintended and perverse conse-
quences that can follow. Economics may be highly mathematized; it may 
even claim to have absorbed the mathematics of information and com-
munication games (Mirowski 2002); but at the core of its form of exper-
tise there is also a fairly imprecise and nonmathematical language game. 
Its tool kit, especially for “economists in the wild,” is chock-full of flow-
ery adjectives that would make a wine critic blush (as in speaking of a 
“soft” market or a “sluggish” recovery), and it is characterized by special 
attention to how things can be done by words, and how to keep the audi-
ence continually guessing. This sort of speech is snake-charming the 
economy. It is certainly a form of public intervention of sorts. But even 
when it appears on the op-ed page of the New York Times it is not “opin-
ion,” not the public intellectual speech variant.
Finally, most of the time the target of economists’ interventions is not 
the open, homogeneous sphere of public opinion but the multiple frail con-
duits by which economic expertise is linked with politics and the state, the 
multiple institutional arenas where economic things become public. In the 
next section, we pay close attention to how one such institutional arena—
the system of national accounts—emerged, and what types of public inter-
vention become possible along this conduit. The general point is that eco-
nomic expertise is not something that is formulated in the academy and 
then “applied” elsewhere. It is a network that stretches from the academy 
through businesses and quasi-governmental organizations, along a perma-
nent “port” into the state. The largest employer for new US economics 
PhDs is the US government (18 percent in 1997), followed by the Interna-
tional Monetary Fund, World Bank, and the Federal Reserve. The only 
discipline better represented in government is physics (Siegfried and Stock 
1999). More importantly, economic expertise is absolutely essential to how 
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modern, liberal societies are governed (Miller and Rose 1990). “Econ-
omy” originally meant the correct manner of governing individuals, 
goods, and wealth, and “political economy” was concerned with how to 
introduce this economy (frugality, rationality, calculability) into the gen-
eral running of the state (Foucault 1991, 92). Even when economics are 
seemingly technical and neutral, they are often about a problem of govern-
ment broadly understood, namely, about the art of governing people, 
things, and relations and leading them toward a convenient end—equitable 
distribution, efficiency, growth, and so on. Economists, therefore, are dif-
ferent from most other experts. Whether or not they are employed by the 
state, economists’ technical field of expertise is never very far from poli-
tics and the public sphere, because it is about how to arrange things, rela-
tions, incentives, and rules so as to produce governability, and because 
liberal states govern by means of calculation. The more technical econo-
mists’ work is, the more it is about “governing by numbers” (Desrosières 
2008; Miller 2004; Porter 1995). So our point is that most economists, 
most of the time, intervene not in the public sphere of opinion but through 
the multiple arenas where economic expertise intersects with the state and 
where numbers are produced through which liberal societies are governed. 
Once again, our point is not to argue that there are no prominent econo-
mists who write or speak about public affairs in the mediatized public 
sphere, but that the analytic question about how economic expertise inter-
venes in public affairs should not be reduced to this rather narrow view. 
Moreover, comparative work on the economics profession (Fourcade 2009) 
demonstrates that the extent to which the public stance of economists cor-
responds to this image of the “public intellectual” is highly variable and 
dependent on specific institutional constellations, on the relations between 
the state, business, the academy, and the media, and the political cultures of 
expertise to which they gave rise. To be an economist and to intervene in 
public affairs means something quite different if you are an American, 
French, or British economist. The “centrality of market institutions to US 
political culture” and the consequent “definition of the economist by a 
technical, measurable form of competence” has meant that American 
economists intervene in the public sphere primarily by producing a “vast 
array of practical instruments that are widely used in policy and business” 
or by mobilizing economic knowledge as a “marketable political commod-
ity that helps different groups with public claims fight one another” (8–9). 
French economists, in contrast, are shaped by a “national political culture 
and institutional makeup centered on the administrative exercise of public 
power” wherein they play the role of technocrats, and where economic 
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knowledge is produced directly as part of the formulation of state policy, so 
economists intervene in public affairs by formulating policy, for example, 
by working for the Commissariat général du plan (11). In the United King-
dom, finally, a “political culture centered on small, tightly knit elite societ-
ies that traditionally enjoy great authority in producing public discourse” 
meant that a greater premium was placed on the “ability to communicate 
economic ideas in plain and eloquent language” through both interpersonal 
networks as well as writing directly to the general, educated public (9–11). 
Put differently, if British economists tend to fit more the image of the “pub-
lic intellectual” as the engaged man of letters (as is evident in the essay on 
John Maynard Keynes by Roger Backhouse and Bradley Bateman, and the 
essay on Lionel Robbins by Susan Howson, both in this volume), this is 
because of the specific constellation connecting Oxbridge with the civil 
service and with elite media outlets and clubs. In this restricted milieu, an 
audience exists for the speech variant that is closest to the image of the 
“public intellectual.” The American case, in comparison, best approxi-
mates the format of public intervention as technical performativity we dis-
cussed earlier: the tight linkage between research departments, businesses, 
and regulatory agencies providing the ideal ecology for it. 
This is, of course, a simplified summary of a much more complex 
analysis. In reality, the different formats of intervention are co-present in 
each national case. The bifurcation of economics in France, for example, 
between state technocrats and academicians leads the latter to attempt to 
influence state policy by writing op-ed pieces in the major newspapers, 
while clubs de réflexion bring together academic economists, senior civil 
servants, journalists, and business and union leaders, forming a horizontal 
network through which economic ideas can influence the governing elites 
(Fourcade 2009, 232–33). This merely vindicates, however, our main 
point, namely, that once we consider how economic knowledge is mobi-
lized to intervene in public affairs we are confronted with a plurality not 
only of agencies and formats of intervention but also of public arenas or 
spheres where such interventions take place. Economists intervene in pub-
lic affairs when they write “directly” to the public in op-ed pieces or gen-
eralist books, but also when they have the ear of business leaders and civil 
servants in more-rarefied forums; when they produce position papers for 
think tanks or are trained by these to become “talking heads”; when they 
become advisers or advocates or expert witnesses on behalf of consumer 
organizations; and also when they work for state agencies or businesses to 
design markets or devise economic indicators.
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The GDP as an Institutionalized Interface 
between Economic Expertise and Statecraft
The preparation of economic indicators and summary indexes may seem a 
dreary technical activity with none of the glamour associated with public 
intellectuals, yet it is a key form in which economic expertise intervenes in 
public affairs. Our example in this essay is the prodigious and, by now, 
four-decades-long collective attempt to provide a summary index of human 
welfare and economic progress that could replace, supplement, or correct 
the GDP. This collective attempt has recently achieved some evident suc-
cess and publicity through the agency of the French government and the 
work of the Commission on the Measurement of Economic Performance 
and Social Progress (CMEPSP), headed by the economists Joseph Stiglitz, 
Amartya Sen, and Jean-Paul Fitoussi (2009). Yet it is important to note that 
the Stiglitz-Sen-Fitoussi project is but the most recent and most famous 
example of what had begun already in 1972 with James Tobin and William 
Nordhaus’s work on the Measure of Economic Welfare (MEW) and was 
continued by a host of other economists working inside and outside aca-
demia, in nongovernmental organizations and think tanks, as well as in 
state economic and statistical agencies and international agencies ranging 
from the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development to the 
United Nations Development Programme (Afsa et al. 2009). In their report, 
Afsa et al. (2009) compile information on thirty extant indexes, but note 
that many more exist, which they could not cover.
We would like to begin, however, with a short history of the GDP itself. 
We argued earlier that economic expertise does not intervene in public 
affairs from without. It is plugged into the body of the Leviathan through 
various permanent ports, institutionalized interfaces between economic 
expertise and statecraft. The GDP, or more precisely the system of national 
accounts, represents such an institutionalized interface. To understand 
current efforts at public intervention by economists who prepare summary 
indexes, we first need to describe the terrain on which they take place, the 
quasi-public sphere that is the system of national accounts.
In a very general sense, economic indicators such as the GDP work in 
the same way as the Black-Scholes formula, or the other calculative 
devices we described under the heading of technical performativity. In a 
perfect market, economic actors would have perfect and complete infor-
mation about economic activities and enough time to peruse and evaluate 
this information to arrive at the optimal investment decision. GDP, CPI, or 
an index of aggregate productivity trends are tools meant to equip the 
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5. Kuznets delegated the task to two of his best students—Robert Nathan and Milton Gil-
bert—both already employed by the Department of Commerce.
economic actor with computational proxies for the information that is 
lacking or cannot be evaluated within human finite time. But this analogy 
to performativity is incomplete and does not capture the historically spe-
cific way in which economic indicators such as the GDP developed and 
how they function in the public sphere.
The GDP owes its origins, in fact, to a transition from the point of view 
of the economic actor to that of the economic governor. The production of 
statistical series of economic aggregates at the National Bureau of Eco-
nomic Research (NBER) began in the 1920s guided by Wesley Mitchell’s 
theory of the business cycle. Mitchell thought that if business managers 
and other economic actors were equipped with these aggregate indicators 
as calculative devices, they would make sound investment decisions 
because they would take “the entire picture of the business economy in 
their calculations.” Consequently, the business cycle would be eliminated 
or at least moderated (Breslau 2003, 405). Mitchell’s ambition, therefore, 
was precisely to achieve what today is called “performativity.” Economic 
expertise would equip business managers with index numbers so that they 
would be better able to calculate, better able to act as rational economic 
actors and thus render markets governable. But this is not how Mitchell’s 
numbers ended up being used. Historians of the system of national 
accounting do not locate its origins in NBER’s efforts during the 1920s 
but in the governmental reaction to the stock market crash of 1929 (Vanoli 
2005, 16–18, 26–27). Simon Kuznets’s (1934) classic estimate of total 
national income produced and national income paid out, to which cur-
rent measures of GDP owe their provenance, was compiled in response to 
a request by the US Senate to estimate the extent to which the economy 
contracted during the Great Depression, 1929–32. The Senate directed the 
Department of Commerce to provide the estimate, but when it became 
evident that it did not have the means to do so, the request was forwarded 
to Mitchell at NBER, who suggested Kuznets.5 Thus the origins of the 
GDP are when the techniques developed at NBER were called on to equip 
the economic governor with the means “to see where the economy has 
been and . . . where it is going and the kinds of policies necessary for gov-
ernments, and private groups or individuals to achieve their objectives” 
(Kendrick 1996, 2; Kapuria-Foreman and Perlman 1995, 1541; Kenessey 
1994, 12–13). Similarly, the Bureau of Economic Analysis (2000) cele-
brates the GDP as “one of the great inventions of the 20th century” and 
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speaks of it as a “beacon that help[s] policymakers steer the economy 
toward the key economic objectives.”
The Senate wanted to know, in short, how bad the depression was, 
whether recovery was under way, and what else could be done. For this 
purpose, however, it needed more than just descriptive statistical aggre-
gates. These had to be linked to one another as a system of causal vari-
ables within a framework that explained how they related to one another 
and what levers they provided for policy. Ultimately, this framework was 
provided by Keynes, but before Keynes—and in an important sense this 
provided the ground on which Keynes’s theory was built—it was provided 
by the introduction of accounting methods and tools, especially double-
entry bookkeeping, turning economic statistics into “social accounting” 
(later “national accounting”) and turning the statistical series into a sys-
tem of controlling accounts. Kuznets drew on the work done by Irving 
Fisher to introduce accounting methods into economics. Thus in 1934, 
before the publication of the General Theory, Kuznets’s empirical analysis 
had already begun measuring these causal variables, to which Keynes 
would give a more solid theoretical grounding. Theory and measurement 
would be adjusted to one another, says Zoltan Kenessey (1994, 112), 
because they responded to the same policy needs. What needs to be added 
is that they were also formulated from the same point of view of “social 
accounting,” the point of view of the economic governor now conceived as 
the accountant balancing the books of the national economy (see also 
Vanoli 2005, 19).
There is a tight linkage, indeed, between the GDP, the application of 
accounting methods to economic analysis, Keynesianism, and the 
invention of the “economy” as an object of knowledge and government. 
As Breslau (2003, 380, 407–8) and Mitchell (1998) convincingly dem-
onstrate, the term the economy simply did not appear in economic texts 
before the 1940s, certainly not in the sense given to it today as a bounded 
totality of economic activity abstracted from social life. The economy 
postdated the huge effort of compiling national statistical series of pro-
duction, prices, wages, and so on, and only through this effort could it 
come to designate the aggregate of a nation’s productive activities. An 
essential part of the whole exercise was to define what is considered 
economic activity and what is not, something that did not bother at all 
the earlier political economists. Kuznets and colleagues “pre-formed” 
the economy by disentangling what they considered obvious evidence 
of “participation . . . in the economic activity of the nation,” that is, 
“work for wages, profit or salary, or . . . capital investment in industry” 
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from what they considered to be “non-economic” activities. The most 
obvious of these was the exclusion of unpaid domestic work, but Kuznets 
and colleagues also excluded other items that previous economists have 
included in their own estimates, such as “imputed net rental,” that is, 
income accruing to people living in their own homes (Kuznets 1934, 4). 
By the same token, however, only through the huge effort of producing the 
concepts and measures of “social accounting” could the “national econ-
omy” come to be understood as the object of “macroeconomics,” that is, 
of a causal theory that treated it as a relatively bounded system of interre-
lated flows. The true beginnings of modern macroeconomics, said Hicks, 
was not the General Theory (1936) but Keynes’s pamphlet How to Pay for 
the War (1940), which worked out a national accounting structure for the 
British economy (quoted in Kurabayashi 1994, 96–98), thereby specifying 
in measurable forms the Keynesian variables. This was the context in 
which the GDP or GNP finally came into being. While the term GNP was 
already used during the 1930s, and Kuznets’s analysis certainly gestured 
at it, World War II provided the final impetus for the formation of a system 
of national accounts, and the annual measurement and publication of GDP 
figures, in both the United States and Britain. In both cases, the GDP and 
related measures were required in order to address questions touching on 
the war effort: How to pay for the war? How to determine the correct bal-
ance between defense and civilian spending (“guns or butter tradeoff”)? 
How to avoid spiraling inflation at the end of war? What would be the 
effect of demobilization on employment? (Kurabayashi 1994, 95; 
Kenessey 1994, 111; Vanoli 2005, 21–23).
From this beginning, the system of national accounts evolved into an 
“articulated macro level statistical response to the operational demands of 
a Keynesian economics” (Ward 2004, 10). At the heart of later critiques of 
the GDP there would be precisely this point that it is not simply an objec-
tive measure of the economy but a translation of the concern with full 
employment and growth—central to Keynesian theory, but also intimately 
tied to the postwar context in the United States and the UK and to the 
ideological struggles of the Cold War—into a quantitative standard. The 
universalization of this standard by the United Nations in the 1950s thus 
biased economic policies in ways that were often harmful to third world 
countries and to substantive conceptions of human welfare (7, 63–67), a 
point made and bemoaned even by Kuznets himself (Kapuria-Foreman 
and Perlman 1995, 1532–33).
We have engaged in this rather brief history of the origins of the GDP 
and the system of national accounts in order to give substance to our claim 
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6. A good example is the indicator of aggregate productivity trends. As Fred Block and 
Gene Burns (1986) show, it was compiled as part of an underconsumptionist explanation for 
the Great Depression. Productivity gains, it was argued, would lead to weakening demand if 
wages do not rise as fast, or prices decline accordingly. Then, through the efforts of the 
Department of Labor, a specific version of the indicator became institutionalized as the linch-
pin in the post–World War II bargain between organized labor and big corporations. The 
indicator thus encapsulated within itself a theory not only of economic processes but no less 
importantly of the “subject” of government, if you will: namely, a conception of the proper 
role of the economic governor in steering and stabilizing the economy, encapsulated in the 
wage and price guidelines issued by the Council of Economic Advisers during the Kennedy 
administration. When the indicator begun showing declines in aggregate productivity in the 
late 1960s, this “fact” framed political debates and empowered wage restraint policies, even 
though, as Block and Burns show, slightly different versions of the indicator would have pro-
duced dramatically different trends. Decision makers were the “slaves” of the defunct econo-
mists who constructed the specific version of the indicator and of the underconsumptionist 
theory encapsulated in it.
that the system of national accounts is a public sphere of sorts, and that 
consequently the design of alternatives to the GDP could be analyzed as a 
form of intervention in public affairs. Economic indicators like the GDP 
are tools meant to provide decision makers with a bird’s-eye view of the 
economy and permit them to make rational decisions, but they are also 
“black boxes” that obscure from view the assumptions, policy choices, and 
history of usage they encapsulate. Thus Keynes’s (1936, 383) oft-quoted 
adage that “practical men, who believe themselves to be quite exempt from 
any intellectual influence, are usually the slaves of some defunct econo-
mist” is particularly apt when considering the impact of economic indica-
tors generally, and of the GDP specifically.6 As noted above, it encapsu-
lated within itself a Keynesian conception of macroeconomic management, 
a certain role for the economic governor, and a restrictive definition of 
human welfare and the activities contributing to it. No less importantly, 
the activities of compiling, calculating, and using the GDP occupy a mul-
titude of economists both inside and outside government: to the 18 percent 
of new economics PhDs being employed in government (Siegfried and 
Stock 1999), we would add a probably equal proportion of new PhDs 
employed in the private sector whose concrete working activities would 
consist primarily of perusing daily the indicators and tables produced by 
the system of national accounts, and another large proportion of academic 
economists who use these as the primary data for their research. The 
activities of compiling, calculating, and using the GDP thus constitute a 
permanent port through which economic expertise is constantly brought to 
bear on some of the most central issues in the public sphere—how to define 
and measure the public good, or human welfare—that the state is entrusted 
with protecting and increasing. Once this port exists, it becomes possible, 
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and indeed inescapable, to intervene in public affairs by changing some 
aspects of the economic expertise flowing through it. No surprise, then, 
that seemingly technical and abstruse debates about how to calculate the 
GDP can involve quite vehement disputes, reflect policy disagreements, 
pitting one against the other divergent political ideologies and the interests 
of nation-states (Popkin 2000; Lower 1990; Ward 2004, 64–67; Aukurst 
1994, 43).
Alternatives to the GDP as Public Interventions
“Economists all know,” declared Nordhaus and Tobin (1972, 4), that 
“maximization of GNP is not a proper objective of policy . . . and yet 
their everyday use of GNP as the standard measure of economic perfor-
mance apparently conveys the impression that they are evangelistic wor-
shipers of GNP.” To correct this impression and to respond to the “limits 
to growth” critics, they constructed a Measure of Economic Welfare 
(MEW) that was largely a rearrangement of the items of the national 
accounts so that what it measured was not output but household con-
sumption (5). They used this measure to reply to the critics of growth-
oriented policies—since the MEW grew at a rate only slightly below the 
GNP. Growth is not obsolete, they declared: “The broad picture of secu-
lar progress which the [GNP and similar measures] convey remains after 
correction of their most obvious deficiencies” (24). This essentially con-
servative move, however, became the first salvo in a much longer offen-
sive that consistently tracked the two issues tackled by Tobin and Nord-
haus, namely, the irrelevance of output measures for estimating human 
welfare and the problem of sustainability (4). Why is it that a relatively 
conservative or defensive position in the public debate about limits to 
growth has become the forerunner of a much more radical effort—as we 
show below—to revise economic priorities, an effort that now counts 
Tobin and Nordhaus as its founding fathers in its retrospective histories? 
The answer is obvious. It has nothing to do with what Tobin and Nord-
haus said, but with how they said it. What mattered to those who fol-
lowed in their footsteps was the fact that Tobin and Nordhaus showed, 
from within NBER, that it is possible to construct an alternative number. 
What counted most, what was innovative, was the mode of intervention 
in public affairs, not the specific position they took in the debate.
Tobin and Nordhaus opened the floodgates. In the years immediately 
following there were several attempts to produce an alternative index of 
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7. See the list of team members, along with links to capsule biographies of each member, 
at hdr.undp.org/en/contacts/about/ (accessed November 8, 2012).
welfare, one that would show—contra Tobin and Nordhaus—that growth 
as measured by the GDP was increasingly irrelevant to the more funda-
mental goal of human welfare. Among these were the Japanese Net 
National Welfare (NNW) indicator in 1973, the Economic Aspects of 
Welfare (EAW) index (Zolatas 1981), the Physical Quality of Life Index 
(PQLI) (Overseas Development Council 1980), and the Index of Sus-
tainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) (Daly and Cobb 1989), which later 
became the Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) (Talberth, Cobb, and Slat-
tery 2007). By far the most successful and influential of these, however, 
is the Human Development Index (HDI) produced by the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP) from 1990 onward.
The story of how the HDI came about is told by Frederick Wherry 
(2004, 161). The main driving force behind the HDI was Mahbub ul Haq, 
a British-trained Pakistani economist who worked at the World Bank 
(1970–82), served as Pakistan’s minister of planning and finance (1982–
88), and then was drafted as special adviser to the UNDP (1989–96). 
Haq—a close personal friend of Amartya K. Sen, later winner of the 
Nobel Prize in economics—wanted “to shift the focus of development 
economics from national income accounting to people centered policies” 
(Fukuda-Parr 2003, 303, 305). That is, he wanted to intervene in public 
affairs and set a new agenda of policy priorities.
Haq, however, did not create the HDI by himself. Compiling the HDI 
was collective work by the Human Development Report Team with a staff 
of five statisticians and economists, and a much larger group of consul-
tants drawn from the Society for International Development (SID), an 
international nonprofit acting as knowledge broker to foster sustainable 
development. Sen was the most famous of these consultants, but all the 
others were also highly respected economists and development profes-
sionals (Wherry 2004, 161). Today, the Human Development Report Team 
consists of eighteen regular staff members who are statisticians, econo-
mists, MBAs as well as one anthropologist.7
Even though the team was assembled under the auspices of the UNDP, 
an administrative unit of the UN, it cultivated a measure of social, physi-
cal, and administrative distance from it. Wherry (2004, 163–64) shows 
quite convincingly that the initial Human Development Report Team that 
first compiled the HDI enjoyed a semi-outsider status that permitted it to 
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act independently to reshape the agenda of development discourse and 
policy. The consultants and the staff were newly recruited to the UN and 
knew each other from SID. As one of them recollected, the team “wasn’t 
a UNDP or a UN thing . . . it was very outside of the UN, [and it was] full 
of a lot of people who are not accountable to the UN.” The team occupied 
offices physically separate from UNDP and enjoyed a protective umbrella 
supplied by the chief administrator of the UNDP, Bill Draper, a former 
venture capitalist. In this sense, the initial team with its consultants was 
more akin to an “epistemic community” than a bureaucracy.
This semiseparation at the institutional and personnel level was bal-
anced by continuity at the level of the actual product of the group’s work. 
The Human Development Report and the HDI were crafted so they bore 
“strong family resemblance” to the World Bank’s World Development 
Report, and also to the GNP. On this latter issue there was dissension 
within the group. Sen and others were concerned that the full complexity 
of human capabilities could not be captured in a single index, but Haq 
responded to their doubts by insisting that “only a single number could 
shift the attention of policy-makers from material output to human well-
being as a real measure of progress.” He argued emphatically that “we 
need a measure . . . of the same level of vulgarity as the GNP—just one 
number—but a measure that is not as blind to the social aspect of human 
lives as the GNP is.” And “vulgar,” or simplistic, indeed it is. The HDI is 
a composite weighted index combining scores for economic growth 
(GDP), health (life expectancy at birth), and education (adult literacy rate 
and student enrollment rates). It thus captures a very general notion of 
“welfare” as material well-being and of “capabilities” as being healthy 
and educated. Despite Sen’s doubts, Haq was convinced that a single, 
composite index number would be much more effective than the written 
reports in “convincing the public, academics, and policy-makers that they 
should evaluate development by advances in human well-being and not 
only by advances in the economy” (Wherry 2004, 165–66; Fukuda-Parr 
2003, 303, 305). Put differently, Haq’s judgment was that in order to 
achieve the public aims of Sen’s intellectual work, the format of interven-
tion had to be changed from one that corresponded to the classical image 
of the public intellectual (which Sen embodies to great effect) to the dif-
ferent format of an index number, however simplistic and “vulgar,” ulti-
mately because it can be plugged into already existing institutions and 
networks of policymaking.
If the classic public intellectual is an outsider, a prophet, Haq and the 
Human Development Report team positioned themselves as insiders/out-
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siders, structurally equivalent to what Georg Simmel (1950) identified as 
the position of the “stranger.” We think this sort of insider-outsider status 
is typical of “specific intellectuals” and in fact illustrates our point that 
intervention happens through an established port or interface. Wherry 
(2004, 164) comments insightfully that this “insider-outsider” status is 
what permitted the team to formulate the HDI as a bold departure from 
business as usual—because they were independent of the administrative 
routines and political pressures of the UN—yet, also as a highly effective 
intervention in development discourse and policy, because they acted 
under the auspices of UNDP and enjoyed the legitimacy, resources, and 
attention it commanded. If they had been either insiders (bureaucrats) or 
outsiders (public intellectuals), they would not have been able to craft this 
effective intervention in public affairs. It was the movement of bringing 
the outsiders in, and the insiders out, along preexisting conduits repre-
sented by SID and by the system of national accounts that explains the 
HDI’s success as public intervention.
And success (or notoriety) it did enjoy. The first report in 1990 pro-
voked a firestorm of criticism (and attention) precisely because of the table 
comparing where countries ranked on the HDI—the United States, second 
in GNP per capita, fell to nineteenth behind most of the advanced indus-
trialized countries, while Cuba shot up forty-four places higher than where 
it ranked by GNP. Yet the report and the index were adopted by the UN 
and were plugged into its normal operations. By 2000, the UNDP was 
printing one hundred thousand copies of the report in ten different lan-
guages for distribution. Many national governments now produce their 
own “human development” report, in hopes of improving their ranking 
(Wherry 2004, 153, 166–67). The assessment of many observers is that 
the HDI managed to change public discourse about development, shifting 
it from being centered on growth and bringing attention to other dimen-
sions of development. It was an effective intervention in public affairs.
However successful, the HDI was also deeply flawed. Its measurement 
of welfare was crude, failing to account for income distribution, subjective 
dimensions of welfare, and the critical literature pointing to the impor-
tance of nonmarket services (Waring 1988), and it did not touch at all on 
the matter of sustainability. Hence its publication merely led to even more 
new indexes. Information about a few representative examples is summa-
rized in table 1. A few points regarding the agencies, modes, and targets of 
intervention are noteworthy.
The first point is that the work of constructing and deconstructing 
economic indicators, as reflected in HDI and these later indicators, is 
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 8. For more on the Happy Planet Index, visit its website at www.happyplanetindex.org/ 
(accessed November 8, 2012).
 9. For more on Redesigning Progress, visit its website at rprogress.org/index.htm 
(accessed November 8, 2012).
10. The 2012 report of the EPI can be found at epi.yale.edu/sites/default/files/down-
loads/2012–epi-full-report.pdf (accessed November 8, 2012).
collective, interdisciplinary, and long-term. Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 
provide the intellectual glamour and public face of the CMEPSP, but 
there are twenty-two other economists and social scientists on the com-
mission, including Kenneth Arrow, Kemal Dervis, Daniel Kahneman, 
and Robert Putnam. More importantly, a team of nine Rapporteurs con-
sisting of leading French statisticians and economists provides much of 
the deeper analysis on which the work of this commission relies (Sti-
glitz, Sen, and Fitoussi 2009). And if the work of the commission, which 
for the moment culminated merely in a report and recommendations, 
were to be translated into a revision of the system of national accounts, a 
new synthetic index and a “dashboard” of additional relevant indicators 
as foreseen, it would surely take a small army of not only junior econo-
mists and statisticians but also environmental scientists, policy analysts, 
psychologists, sociologists, and the all-important accountants to compile 
it. Similarly, the Happy Planet Index (HPI), which purports to measure 
“the relative efficiency with which nations convert the planet’s natural 
resources into long and happy lives for their citizens,” is compiled at the 
Centre for Well-Being at the New Economics Foundation (NEF), by a 
large team of fellows and researchers with backgrounds in economics, 
operations research, experimental psychology, political science, and so 
on.8 The Genuine Progress Indicator (GPI) is a composite index devel-
oped on the basis of the earlier ISEW. It is compiled by a team of econo-
mists and environmental experts at Redefining Progress, a public policy 
think tank in Oakland, California.9 The Environmental Performance 
Index (EPI)—“a composite index tracking a diverse set of socioeco-
nomic, environmental, and institutional indicators that characterize and 
influence environmental sustainability at the national scale”—is com-
piled jointly by the Earth Institute at Columbia University and the Cen-
ter for Environmental Law and Policy at Yale University. A core team of 
five investigators draws on several dozen expert contributors, some of 
whom are economists and many are environmental scientists.10 In short, 
the production of indexes and economic indicators is the work of collec-
tives composed of a large number of individuals representing different 
disciplines, forms of expertise, and institutional affiliations.
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The second point is about the format of public intervention in these 
examples, which is not an op-ed, a petition, a book, or a blog, but typically 
a number. Granted, the number is usually surrounded by a whole lot of 
words: programmatic launch statements, “discussion,” technical clarifica-
tions, and so on, but ultimately the whole endeavor of producing summary 
index numbers would not make sense if the participants did not believe 
that, so to speak, a single number is worth a thousand words. Unlike HDI, 
the numbers now incorporate a measure of sustainability. The GPI incor-
porates the estimated costs of air pollution and destruction of the natural 
environment. The HPI measures the ecological efficiency with which 
well-being is provided by incorporating a measure of “ecological foot-
print” in the denominator. The EPI measures the degree to which a coun-
try is moving toward the policy goals of environmental health and ecosys-
tem vitality.
The exception that proves the rule is the report coauthored by Stiglitz, 
Sen, and Fitoussi. They explicitly reject the idea that their target should be 
a single index number. There is a sense that this report, coming two 
decades after the HDI, now marks the end of an era. As noted earlier, the 
French team compiled information on thirty extant indexes, but noted 
that many more exist (Afsa et al. 2009). In such a saturated field, it is per-
haps no longer a meaningful intervention to produce one more number, 
one more acronym, which most likely will disappear among the many 
similar sounding indexes, or at best would be incorporated like the HDI 
alongside the GDP, but only as supporting cast. Instead, Stiglitz, Sen, and 
Fitoussi (2009) did two things. First, they compiled an exhaustive and 
critical review of all extant indexes, including the GDP, and the differ-
ent approaches taken in compiling them. Pointing out the deficiencies, 
they argue for the need to create a new international system of national 
accounts capable of calculating a corrected measure for GDP (which 
would include nonmarket services), objective and subjective measures of 
well-being, and a measure of sustainability. Put differently, their report 
opens up the “black boxes” of which economic indicators, both main-
stream and alternative ones, are made, pillages their components, and 
proposes a new set of accounts that would pre-form “the economy” in a 
different way. This new system of national accounts would define, for 
later decision makers, not only the facts on which they base their calcula-
tions but also their own proper role as governors of economic life. This is 
exactly what is being attempted also by the other three measures surveyed 
here, although in more piecemeal fashion. The task of the economic gov-
History of Political Economy
Published by Duke University Press
Economic Indicators as Public Interventions 247
11. Our information regarding Redefining Progress comes from Source Watch, which is 
published by the Center for Media and Democracy and can be found at www.sourcewatch.
org/index.php?title=Redefining_Progress (accessed November 8, 2012). According to the 
website of the Center for Media and Democracy, Source Watch is a “collaborative resource 
for citizens and journalists looking for documented information about the corporations, 
industries, and people trying to influence public policy and public opinion” (www.source-
watch.org/index.php/SourceWatch).
12. See the description of Maryland’s GPI at www.green.maryland.gov/mdgpi/ (accessed 
November 8, 2012).
ernor, they argue, is not to maximize growth but to maximize sustainable 
welfare and well-being, and to achieve this goal the government needs an 
appropriate index—indeed, a whole new system of national accounts –
that brings into calculation what were previously deemed incalculable 
externalities. 
The third point is about the target of intervention common to these 
projects. To our mind, they all are built around a similar inside-outside 
movement as we saw with the HDI. It is true that the GPI, HPI, and EPI 
are produced by either independent nonprofit organizations (essentially, 
think tanks) or university institutes, and thus they exhibit a measure of 
independence and distance from national or international bureaucracies. 
At the same time, however, they seek to plug their indexes into the existing 
ports or conduits through which economic expertise flows into the state, 
and therefore they cultivate social ties that facilitate this plug-in. Redefin-
ing Progress, where the GPI is calculated, although it was begun by a 
renegade environmental economist and a theologian, is now a respected 
public policy think tank, with a former Republican congressman as execu-
tive director, a host of corporate funders, and former managers from 
PG&E, Apple, and other corporations on its board of directors.11 It has 
offered its GPI as a “guide for public policy” and had some success per-
suading the state of Maryland to adopt it.12 An affiliated think tank, GPI-
Atlantic, has taken up the same cause in Nova Scotia, Canada, and pro-
vides regional government there with policy briefs as well as with a 
comprehensive system of Nova Scotia GPI Accounts (Pannozzo and Col-
man 2009).
The New Economics Foundation (NEF), where HPI is produced, char-
acterizes itself as a “think and do tank” that is in the business of “pro-
moting innovative solutions that challenge mainstream thinking on eco-
nomic, environment and social issues.” It is one of the biggest think 
tanks in the UK with a permanent staff of fifty and a continuous set of 
activities apart from compiling the GPI, including advocacy among 
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13. www.happyplanetindex.org/about (accessed March 22, 2013). A history of NEF can be 
found on the organization’s website at www.neweconomics.org/content/history-nef (accessed 
November 8, 2012).
14. For a complete list of its advisory board members, see earth.columbia.edu/articles/
view/1006 (accessed November 8, 2012).
members of Parliament and seeding other grassroots organizations such 
as Jubilee 2000, the Ethical Trading Initiative, and so on. While it targets 
some of its campaigns to policymakers, it operates at a much more popu-
list and grassroots level than Redefining Progress. When HPI was first 
constructed in 2006, the report was published on the Web, and NEF 
proudly reports that within two days it was downloaded by a million users 
in 185 countries. The whole initiative to form NEF came out of The Other 
Economic Summit (TOES), which challenged “the right of the G7 lead-
ers to speak for the economic future of the planet.” It was supposed to be 
a permanent economic secretariat for TOES, but evolved into something 
much more far-ranging. NEF emphasizes that its proposals are often 
designed and run in participation with “local people” and that it “work[s] 
with all sections of society in the UK and internationally—civil society, 
government, individuals, businesses and academia.”13
The Earth Institute at Columbia University, which partners with the 
Yale Center for Environmental Law and Policy to calculate the EPI, is not 
your garden-variety academic institute. It is led by one of the best-known 
and better politically connected US economists, Jeffrey Sachs. It is a 
mammoth enterprise comprising thirty centers and a staff of 850. Earth 
Institute experts advise national governments and the United Nations on 
issues related to sustainable development, combining expertise in eco-
nomics with basic science and advocacy. Its advisory board includes eco-
nomic luminaries such as Kenneth Arrow, celebrities such as Bono, and 
financiers such as George Soros.14 In short, while it is physically located at 
a university, and while its activities center on an academic core, it is best 
analyzed as inhabiting an interface between academia, government, busi-
ness, and the media, as do other think tanks (Medvetz 2012).
CMEPSP, of course, differs from these three organizations by being 
conducted officially under the auspices of the French government, but it is 
plain that it enjoys a similar insider-outsider status as did the HDI team. 
The involvement of the French president served, in fact, to buffer the ini-
tiative from bureaucratic pressures, and the intellectual glamour com-
manded by Stiglitz, Sen, and Fitoussi did the rest. The report identifies its 
audience as composed of political leaders and relevant policymakers, who 
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use the indicators to formulate policies, as well as the academic commu-
nity and the national statistical offices, and only lastly civil society organi-
zations to the extent that they are producers and users of statistics (Stiglitz, 
Sen, and Fitoussi 2009). 
It is clear from the emphasis on doing, on solutions, on policymakers, 
on the users of statistics, and on working with local people, that the target 
of intervention is not opinion but a semitechnical, semipolitical network 
into which these organizations aim to plug their indicator. Or more pre-
cisely, some of these organizations indeed pay a good deal of attention to 
mobilizing and shaping opinion. NEF has a charter that supporters can 
sign online. NEF, Redefining Progress, and the Earth Institute all employ 
communications and public affairs staff who work to guarantee media 
space and attention to the research staff. Many on their staff write blogs 
and op-eds. But compared with the effort to have the GPI, HPI, or EPI 
adopted as a basis for analysis and policy, this work at the level of opinion 
is the least original and least important aspect of their intervention in 
public affairs. Some of these organizations identify themselves as belong-
ing to a burgeoning new field of “green economics,” understood as an 
alternative to neoclassical or mainstream economics. Green economics 
are, quite plainly, neither a purely academic pursuit nor pure advocacy or 
opinion but a technical network of experts, organizations, and calcula-
tive devices that extends along the same conduit or port by which eco-
nomic expertise is plugged into the state, namely, the system of national 
accounts. This network typically uses as its input government data and 
components from the system of national accounts, and its output as well 
is meant to plug back into government policy in the form of index 
numbers, policy position papers, and, most ambitiously with CMEPSP, 
a complete overhaul of the system of national accounts to reflect a new 
epistemic and moral agenda. Taken as a whole, this network definitely 
fits Peter Haas’s (1992, 3) concept of “epistemic community,” namely, a 
far-flung network of “professionals with recognized expertise and com-
petence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area,” who are tied together 
by shared truth claims and a public moral stance (see also Adler and 
Haas 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998; King 2005). In this field at least, this 
network or epistemic community is a far more effective “collective intel-
lectual” than public intellectuals addressing public opinion, as it gradu-
ally has been changing not only the agenda of public policy but its very 
infrastructure.
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